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THE RAILROAD QUESTION REVISITED 
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY V. MINNESOTA 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE REGULATIONS 
JAMES W. ELY, JR. 
Few issues more vexed Americans during the 
Gilded Age than the regulation of railroads. 
America's first big business, the railroads wielded 
enormous economic power and by the end of 
the nineteenth century represented 10 percent 
of national wealth. 1 Farmers and other local 
shippers often viewed railroads as an exploita-
tive monopoly and blamed them for excessive 
and discriminatory charges. They repeatedly 
clamored for regulation of the freight and pas-
senger rates fixed by railroad companies. Ag-
ricultural interests in the Great Plains states 
were particularly active in seeking regulatory 
legislation. Railroad investors and managers, on 
the other hand, opposed regulatory laws and 
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defended their autonomy to determine rates. 
They feared that governmental control of rates 
would benefit shippers and farmers at the ex-
pense of the railroads by imposing unreasonably 
low charges. Moreover, they asserted that reg-
ulation of rates would likely impair capital in-
vestment and thus stifle railroad growth and 
economic development. 
Sectional division was evident in the legis-
lative response to the growth of railroads. The 
eastern states created advisory commissions that 
could make reports and recommend reforms but 
had no enforcement power or authority to set 
transportation rates. 2 Skeptical about the effi-
cacy of competition, western farmers demanded 
more stringent governmental control of railroad 
operations. Their growing resentment was 
heightened when western railroads passed under 
the control of eastern investors. During the 
1870s the Granger movement spearheaded the 
drive for the initial wave of more radical state 
railroad regulations. Many midwestern and 
southern state legislatures enacted so-called 
Granger laws to control the prices charged by 
railroads and related utilities, such as grain el-
evators and warehouses. They also established 
powerful commissions to supervise railroad op-
erations and enforce regulatory laws. 3 
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In Munn v. Illinois (1877) the Supreme Court 
adopted a deferential attitude toward legislative 
authority to regulate economic activity. Sus-
taining an Illinois law that set the rate for stor-
ing grain in Chicago elevators, Chief Justice 
Morrison R. Waite ruled that "when private 
property is devoted to a public use, it is subject 
to public regulation." Whether this public in-
terest doctrine applied to a particular enterprise 
was considered a matter for legislative judg-
ment. Although recognizing that the owner of 
property "clothed with a public interest" was 
entitled to reasonable compensation, Chief Jus-
tice Waite further declared that the determi-
nation of such compensation was a legislative, 
not a judicial, task. The only protection for 
property owners against legislative abuse was 
resort to the political process. Justice Stephen 
J. Field vigorously dissented, warning that un-
der the Munn rationale "all property and all 
business in the State are held at the mercy of 
a majority of its legislature." Asserting that grain 
storage was a private business, he maintained 
that the due process clause afforded substantive 
protection to owners in the use and income of 
their property.4 In practice state legislatures rarely 
applied the Munn doctrine to control the charges 
of any major business other than railroads. 
Ouring the 1880s judicial attitudes began to 
change. The Supreme Court receded from the 
deferential approach of Munn and adopted a 
more skeptical posture toward state regulation 
of property and business. In Stone v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co. (1886), for instance, the jus-
tices upheld a Mississippi statute that empow-
ered a commission to regulate railroad rates, but 
they cautioned that such authority was not un-
limited. Chief Justice Waite observed that "the 
State cannot require a railroad corporation to 
carry persons or property without reward; nei-
ther can it do that which in law amounts to a 
taking of private property for public use without 
just compensation, or without due process of 
law."5 Simultaneously the Supreme Court be-
gan to formulate a substantive interpretation of 
the due process clause to safeguard fundamental 
property rights. 6 This laid the basis for the doc-
trine of economic due process. The court took 
another step away from Munn in Wabash, St-
Louis & Pacific Railway v. Illinois (1886), holding 
that state regulation of interstate railroad rates 
unconstitutionally invaded federal power under 
the commerce clause. 7 
State courts likewise moved toward increased 
scrutiny of rate regulations. In Spring Valley Water 
Works v. San Francisco (1890) the Supreme Court 
of California invalidated a municipal ordinance 
fixing the rates charged by a privately-owned 
water company. Cautioning that "[r]egulation, 
as provided for in the constitution, does not 
mean confiscation, or a taking without just 
compensation," the court asserted judicial au-
thority to review the reasonableness of regulated 
prices. 8 
Historians agree that Chicago, Milwaukee & 
St. Paul Railway Company v. Minnesota (1890) 
was a milestone in the evolution of economic 
due process. 9 The decision inaugurated an era 
of increased judicial scrutiny of railroad and util-
ity rate fixing and enhanced the protection of 
property rights. Yet this landmark ruling has 
received relatively little attention from schol-
ars. In view of the renewed interest in economic 
rights,1O it seems pertinent to examine the lit-
igation that culminated in Chicago, Milwaukee ll 
and to assess the decision's place in constitu-
tional history. 
BACKGROUND OF THE CONTROVERSY 
In the early 1870s Minnesota experimented 
briefly with railroad rate regulation but aban-
doned the system in 1875 amid fears that 
governmental controls discouraged capital in-
vestment. A decade later many western and 
southern states joined in a new wave of strin-
gent railroad rate regulations. 12 Minnesota was 
no exception. Republicans dominated Minne-
sota politics throughout the Gilded Age, a fact 
that underscores the public consensus favoring 
regulation of railroad activities. In March of 
1887 the Minnesota legislature enacted a com-
prehensive scheme to regulate the intrastate ac-
tivities of common carriers. 13 Building upon 1885 
legislation that established the Railroad and 
Warehouse Commission, lawmakers provided 
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FIG. 1. A Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway passenger train leaving the Milwaukee Union Depot about 
1890. Photograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library, Milwaukee Road Collection. 
that all charges for railroad services "shall be 
equal and reasonable." 
Carriers were required to file a schedule of 
rates with the commission, and the commis-
sioners were empowered to review the reason-
ableness of charges. The commission could order 
a railroad to change any fare deemed unequal 
or unreasonable and could impose a recom-
mended rate. If a railroad failed to comply with 
such a rate directive the commission could seek 
a writ of mandamus. The statute also prohibited 
unreasonable preferences to any shipper and 
outlawed rebates and the practice of charging 
more for transportation for a short distance than 
a long distance. Because at that time neither 
the Interstate Commerce Commission nor most 
state railroad commissions had the authority to 
fix charges, the Minnesota law went beyond the 
prevailing regulatory models. 
Organized under Wisconsin law in 1874, the 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Com-
pany was the successor to numerous small rail-
roads. By the late 1880s the company owned 
nearly 6000 miles of completed track, more than 
1400 grain elevators, and numerous terminal 
facilities. The railroad's main line ran between 
Minneapolis and St. Paul and Chicago, and 
other lines extended into Iowa, Wisconsin, Ne-
braska, and the Dakotas. It was one of four 
major carriers that served the northern prairie 
states. 14 Operating in states strongly influenced 
by Granger agitation, the Chicago, Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Railway had long battled state fare 
regulations. 
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In June of 1887 local boards of trade com-
plained to the Minnesota Railroad Commission 
that the rates charged by the Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Railway for transporting milk 
from various points within Minnesota to St. 
Paul and Minneapolis were unreasonably high. 
The company countered that the milk rates were 
in fact low. After a hearing at which both the 
petitioners and the railroad were represented, 
the commission concluded that the charges for 
transporting milk from Owatonna and Faribault 
were unreasonable. The commission directed 
that a rate of 211z cents per gallon in ten-gallon 
cans be substituted for the existing rate of 3 
cents per gallon. When the railroad refused to 
carry out the recommended reduction in milk 
rates, the attorney general, acting for the com-
mission, procured a writ of mandamus from the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota directing the rail-
road to obey the order or show cause why it 
should not be followed. The railroad challenged 
the constitutionality of the rate fixing provision 
on three grounds: (1) that the legislative au-
thority to set transportation rates could not be 
delegated to the commission, (2) that under its 
franchise the railroad was entitled to determine 
transportation rates, and (3) that the commis-
sion's order constituted "a pro tanto taking" of 
the railroad's property in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Counsel further argued that the statute did not 
provide for a hearing and that the reasonable-
ness of rates was a judicial question. 15 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota unani-
mously upheld the commission's order in April 
of 1888. After disposing of jurisdictional 
issues, the court considered the nature of the 
commission's rate-setting powers. The court 
construed the statute to mean that rates rec-
ommended by the commission "should be not 
simply advisory, nor merely prima facie equal 
and reasonable, but final and conclusive as to 
what are lawful or equal and reasonable 
charges. "16 Consequently the court refused to 
review the reasonableness of rates set by the 
commission. 
Turning to the constitutional objections, the 
court relied heavily on the Munn decision and 
stressed the need for legislative control of rail-
roads. The court described railroads as "prac-
tically the public highway system of the country," 
and declared that "no modem civilized com-
munity could long endure that their public 
highway system should be in the uncontrolled, 
exclusive use of private owners. The only al-
ternative was either governmental regulation or 
governmental ownership of the roads." 17 The 
court charged that railroads, "and even the em-
inent counsel for the respondent in this case," 
were reluctant to accept the legitimacy of leg-
islative supervision. Nor were the judges sym-
pathetic to the argument that the power to fix 
rates might be abused and in effect deprive the 
railroads of property without due process. Last 
the court rejected the contention that the act 
improperly delegated legislative power to the 
commission. The judges reasoned that the leg-
islature had not conferred upon the commission 
power to make law but simply granted admin-
istrative discretion to carry out the regulatory 
purpose of the statute. 
The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway 
petitioned for a reargument in part on the 
grounds that the court did not consider later 
rulings that limited the Munn decision. When 
this petition was denied the company obtained 
a writ of error to bring the case before the Su-
preme Court of the United States. Meanwhile, 
the order of the commission went into effect. 
SUPREME COURT DECISION 
The appeal was argued before the Supreme 
Court on 13 and 14 January 1890. The railroad 
was represented by its able general counsel, John 
W. Cary. He was experienced in rate litigation 
before the Supreme Court, having previously 
appeared in several companion cases to Munn. 18 
A proponent of laissez-faire constitutionalism, 
Cary labored to secure judicial protection for 
the rights of railroads against state regulation. 
He espoused the principle that property own-
ership encompassed the right to set the price 
for its use. Cary argued that in order to vindicate 
property rights the reasonableness of rates was 
a matter for judicial inquiry. In short, Cary was 
prominent among a group of attorneys who were 
instrumental in promoting laissez-faire values 
and advocating a strong role for the courts in 
limiting state regulatory power. 19 
This laissez-faire philosophy guided Cary's 
arguments on behalf of the Chicago, Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Railway. He first contended that the 
rate-setting provisions violated the corporate 
charter in which the Minnesota Territory granted 
the railroad directors power to fix "the rate of 
tolls." Hence the Minnesota legislation uncon-
stitutionally impaired the obligation of contract 
by interfering with the company's rights under 
its charter. 20 
More significantly Cary then endeavored to 
restrict application of the Munn decision. In-
sisting that the right to receive value for use of 
one's property was an essential attribute of own-
ership, he charged that the Minnesota court 
judgment "violates the natural right which be-
longs to every one to fix the price of his services 
and of his property or its use." Cary conceded 
that Munn limited a railroad to charging rea-
sonable rates, but he denied a legislature's "right 
to arbitrarily and finally fix or determine such 
charges by positive statutes." He agreed that a 
legislature, under its police power, could regu-
late railroad operations to protect the safety of 
persons. Cary maintained, however, that this 
power did not give lawmakers the right to fix 
transportation charges. In an impassioned plea, 
Cary argued that rate regulation was unprece-
dented and "destructive of the rights of property 
and more to be feared than the insane ravings 
of the advocates of socialism and the com-
mune." He charged that railroads could be com-
pelled to provide services at an unremunerative 
rate, effectively confiscating their property. Thus 
Cary sought to reopen the broad question of 
legislative control of railroad fares. Contending 
that "[i)nvestments in railroad property are en-
titled to the same protection and consideration 
as other investments," he maintained that a 
reasonable rate must include "a fair return on 
the value of the investment or plant of the 
railroad. "21 Cary finished by arguing that the 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway was 
engaged in interstate commerce and was not 
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FIG. 2. John W. Cary (1817-1895) was the principal 
legal advisor of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railway for many years and argued on behalf of the 
carrier in the famous Chicago, Milwaukee case. Pho-
tograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library, 
Milwaukee Road Collection. 
subject to the Minnesota law since passage of 
the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887. 
Attorney General Moses E. Clapp defended 
the Minnesota rate-fixing act. As might be ex-
pected, he emphasized the "unbroken line" of 
Supreme Court decisions commencing with 
Munn that sustained the power of legislatures 
to establish rates for common carriers. He rec-
ognized that a state could not use regulatory 
authority to confiscate property but disputed the 
company's allegations that the milk rate was 
unreasonable. Clapp concluded by emphasizing 
first that state legislatures could decide what 
constituted a reasonable transportation rate and 
second that "the question of the reasonableness 
of the rate is a question for legislative deter-
mination, and when so determined, ceases to 
be the subject of judicial inquiry. "22 
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On 24 March the Supreme Court in a brief 
opinion ruled that the rate statute, as construed 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court, deprived the 
railroad of property without due process of law. 23 
Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller assigned the 
task of preparing the court's opinion to Justice 
Samuel Blatchford. One historian has suggested 
that this assignment was prompted by Fuller's 
belief that Blatchford, a consensus builder, could 
fashion an opinion that would hold together a 
precarious majority for a significant constitu-
tional innovation. 24 
The court first rejected the railroad's con-
tract clause argument. Justice Blatchford held 
that the general language in the company's 
charter conferring the power to collect tolls did 
not constitute a contract freeing the company 
from any legislative control. This finding simply 
affirmed the settled doctrine that corporate 
charters were strictly construed. 
The justices, however, found a procedural 
infirmity in the Minnesota rate law. Although 
the precise nature of the defect was unclear from 
the opinion, the court was obviously disturbed 
about the conclusive nature of the administra-
tive process that determined rates. Justice 
Blatchford pointed out that the statute did not 
provide for notice or a hearing before the com-
mission or for judicial review of rates. 25 This 
was a somewhat curious point because, in fact, 
the company received both notice and a hear-
ing. Justice Blatchford was seemingly concerned 
that the commission might find rates to be un-
reasonable sua sponte without any hearing. 
The court then moved beyond this proce-
dural objection and asserted the authority to 
review the fairness of rates imposed by state law. 
"The question of the reasonableness of a rate 
of charge for transportation by a railroad com-
pany," Justice Blatchford observed, " ... is 
eminently a question for judicial investigation, 
requiring due process of law for its determina-
tion." He added: 
If the company is deprived of the power of 
charging reasonable rates for the use of its 
property, and such deprivation takes place 
in the absence of an investigation by judicial 
machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use 
of its property, and thus, in substance and 
effect, of the property itself, without due pro-
cess of law and in violation of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 26 
Blatchford's opinion was somewhat nebulous 
with re~pect to the scope of judicial review and 
did not expressly direct a judicial investigation 
of rates. But the ruling has generally been 
understood as establishing that the reasonable-
ness of rates was subject to independent court 
review. Thus, the Chicago, Milwaukee decision 
contradicted a fundamental principle of Munn 
that rate setting was solely a legislative func-
tion. Moreover, it signaled the court's accep-
tance of the due process clause as a substantive 
restriction on state legislation authority. 
Concurring "with some hesitation," Justice 
Samuel F. Miller provided a more compelling 
explanation of the constitutional need for ju-
dicial review of rates. He recognized that the 
states could exercise their authority to regulate 
transportation charges either by direct legisla-
tion or through a commission. But states could 
not apply either procedure to set a rate "which 
is so unreasonable as to practically destroy the 
value of property of persons engaged in the car-
rying business." It followed that there was "an 
ultimate remedy" for aggrieved parties in the 
federal courts, which had a duty to inquire into 
the reasonableness of rates. 27 
Speaking for the three dissenters, Justice Jo-
seph D. Bradley complained that the decision 
effectively overruled Munn and made the courts 
"the final arbiter" in rate regulations. He main-
tained that the determination of reasonable 
charges was a legislative question, involving 
considerations of policy as well as remunera-
tion. In his view, judicial relief was only avail-
able for fraudulent or arbitrary deprivation of 
property. He insisted that in this case there was 
no infringement of property rights "but merely 
a regulation as to the enjoyment of property. "28 
D 
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FIG. 3. An 1894 map iUustrates the extensive route of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway through 
the upper Midwest and eastern Great Plains. Photograph courtesy of the Milwaukee Public Library, Milwaukee 
Road Collection. 
REsPONSE 
Whatever the ambiguities of Justice Blatch-
ford's opinion, contemporary observers were 
quick to perceive a sea change in the Supreme 
Court's attitude toward rate regulations. "It is 
everywhere regarded as a most important de-
cision," the New York Times reported. Railroad 
officials were elated. An assistant general man-
ager of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railway commented that "the decision is a ray 
of hope to railroads oppressed by confiscatory 
legislation." One railroad agent declared that 
the cartiers "could now feel secure of their prop-
erty." Another railroad manager added, "I think 
the action of the highest court in the country 
will call a halt on this [granger] class of legis-
lation." The Winona Daily Republican quipped: 
"Whenever you see a railroad man smile now 
a days you may look to the Supreme court de-
cision for its inspiration. "29 
Reaction in Minnesota was generally hostile. 
As might be expected, the Populists were par-
ticularly bitter. The executive committee of the 
State Farmers' Alliance unanimously adopted a 
series of resolutions prepared by Ignatius Don-
nelly severely censuring the Supreme Court. 
The resolutions declared that the Chicago, Mil-
waukee decision signified "the subjection of the 
people and the states to the unlimited control 
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of the railroad corporations of this country." 
Attacking the concept of judicial review, the 
resolutions appealed "from this second Dred 
Scott decision to the people of the nation; and 
we ask them to consider whether any other race 
would submit to have their liberties thus whee-
dled away from them, on technicalities, by a 
squad of lawyers, sitting as a supreme authority 
high above Congress, president and people." 
Last, the executive committee charged that in 
"our anxiety to protect the rights of property 
we have created a machinery which threatens 
to destroy the rights of man. "30 
Newspaper comment, while more restrained, 
was also largely negative. The Minneapolis Tri-
bune maintained that "the Western Legislatures 
and commissions have in general been suffi-
ciently lenient and reasonable in their demands 
for reduction of rates." Although agreeing that 
the railroads should have a right to be heard, 
the Tribune worried that the decision might al-
low the carriers "through tediously and cun-
ningly delayed litigation to break down" the 
power of regulation. Similarly, the Red Wing 
Argus observed that the Chicago, Milwaukee rul-
ing caused people to wonder "whether the leg-
islators or the courts made the laws of the land." 
The Winona Daily Republican charged that the 
Supreme Court "takes the purely technical view 
of the question involved, and ... looks first of 
all and chiefly to the interests of the roads. "31 
In contrast, the St. Paul Dispatch hailed the 
Chicago, Milwaukee ruling and decried the 1887 
act as "the product of an unreasoning warfare 
upon the railroads." The Dispatch called upon 
the legislature to adopt "the more moderate pol-
icy" of the eastern states in supervising railroad 
operations. Likewise the St. Paul Pioneer Press 
commended the Supreme Court for fixing "an 
insuperable barrier against the tide of destruc-
tive agrarian and confiscatory legislation and 
judicial decisions which have threatened the 
unlimited spoliation of all railroad properties. "3Z 
Leading legal journals tended to look with 
favor on the Chicago, Milwaukee decision. An 
article in the Albany Law Journal defended ju-
dicial review of rates "because if otherwise, it 
would be giving to the Legislature the authority 
of deciding the constitutionality of their own 
acts." One commentator in the America Law 
Register construed the decision as strengthening 
the rights of property owners against the im-
position of rates that resulted in a deprivation 
of property. He declared that "all lovers of in-
dividualliberty, of law and justice can properly 
rejoice. It is a most momentous decision. " Such 
enthusiasm was not universal. A note in the 
American Law Review sharply criticized the rul-
ing and emphasized the interpretative problems 
posed by Justice Blatchford's ambiguous opin-
ion. The author was uncertain whether the de-
cision turned on a narrow procedural point or 
established broad judicial supervision of legis-
lative rate determinations. If it implied the lat-
ter, he decried the decision as "an overturning 
of the fundamental principles upon which all 
our American governments are founded. "33 
As the debate over Chicago, Milwaukee raged, 
Minnesota officials worked to salvage the reg-
ulatory scheme. The railroad commissioners 
recommended that the law be amended to in-
clude judicial review of rates. This approach was 
adopted by Governor William R. Merriam, a 
Republican, in his 1891 message to the legis-
lature. Avoiding any criticism of the decision, 
he pointed out that when the regulatory statute 
was enacted it was generally understood that 
the legislature was the final arbiter as to what 
rates were reasonable. Governor Merriam ex-
plained that the Supreme Court 
has determined that action upon such mat-
ters is not final either in a commission or in 
the legislature itself. The power of the leg-
islature to make reasonable rates for common 
carriers is not denied, but whether a given 
rate so made is reasonable is a judicial ques-
tion, and must be settled as other matters of 
law and fact are determined, through the 
medium of the courts. 34 
Accordingly, he urged a statutory amendment 
to provide a method of judicial review. 
Heeding the governor's request, lawmakers 
amended the 1887 rate statute. Much of the 
earlier measure was unchanged, but the amend-
ment stipulated that rates set by the commission 
should be treated only as prima facie evidence 
of reasonableness. The amendment also pro-
vided for notice and a full administrative hear-
ing before the commission. Finally, the amended 
statute expressly established the right of a rail-
road to appeal commission orders to the state 
district courts, which had jurisdiction to ex-
amine "the whole matter in controversy. "35 
These changes brought the Minnesota rate law 
into conformity with the constitutional require-
ments of Chicago, Milwaukee. 
ASSESSMENT 
Although' a major victory for the railroads, 
the outcome in Chicago, Milwaukee did not in-
augurate an era of laissez-faire in the transpor-
tation industry. The fears of the Populists to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court continued to rec-
ognize the power of state legislatures to regulate 
railroad and storage rates. The federal judiciary 
only protected carriers against unreasonable 
charges, and the railroads had to demonstrate 
their unreasonableness. 36 Still, the Chicago, 
Milwaukee ruling materially restricted state reg-
ulatory authority, and lawsuits seeking to in-
validate state-imposed rates multiplied rapidly 
in the next decade. 
Despite the Supreme Court's retreat from the 
Munn doctrine, the decision was not an abrupt 
departure from existing constitutional norms. 
Starting in 1886 the court had cautioned in 
several cases that states could not, consistent 
with due process, impose confiscatory rates on 
regulated industries. 37 The justices came to re-
alize that unlimited power of regulation might 
be used to destroy the value of railroad property. 
Once the Supreme Court distinguished between 
rate regulation and confiscation, judicial su-
pervision of rates followed logically. Judicial 
oversight simply provided a vehicle by which 
the justices could vindicate property rights 
against confiscatory legislation. If the states had 
unlimited power to fix charges, then constitu-
tional protection against confiscation was illu-
sory and regulated industries had only those 
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rights to use property that lawmakers chose to 
recognize. 
Why did the Supreme Court move away from 
the Munn doctrine of unfettered legislative power 
to control rates? Scholars have sometimes de-
picted Chicago, Milwaukee as part of a pervasive 
pro-business bias on the part of the justices. 38 
This rationale is problematic. After all, during 
the Gilded Age the Supreme Court upheld many 
state-imposed regulations on business activity. 
A more compelling explanation, offered by Mary 
Cornelia Porter, is that the court "was less in-
terested in rate regulation per se than in assuring 
that regulated utilities would continue to attract 
the investment capital necessary for expanding 
and improving services to the public. "39 The 
importance of investment security was clear to 
contemporary observers. One railroad official 
revealingly stressed that the Chicago, Milwaukee 
decision "will afford a very great safeguard to 
railroad investments." He explained that the 
ruling "comes at a very opportune time, for the 
reason that the frequent attacks in the West on 
railroad property by legislators and commission-
ers were beginning to sap the confidence of 
investors all over the world in the safety of 
investments in American railroad properties. "40 
This was a crucial point because Europeans in-
vested heavily in many western railroads, in-
cluding the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railway. 41 
Railroads long had feared that legislatively 
imposed rates would favor local interests and 
discourage long-term economic growth. An of-
ficial of the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Railway explained that 
the railways have back of their adjustment 
of the rates the selfish interest of their own 
prosperity, which depends upon the pros-
perity of all the business on their lines, while 
a political commission if given this power 
would have nothing at stake but the political 
success of the influences which placed it in 
office. 42 
The growing intensity of rate regulation in the 
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Gilded Age made the court more aware of the 
deficiencies in the Munn doctrine and increas-
ingly sympathetic to the position of the rail-
roads. In short, experience served to undermine 
judicial confidence in legislative and adminis-
trative rate determinations. Gradually the jus-
tices saw Munn in a new light. While no doubt 
concerned about unwarranted intrusion on the 
property rights of the railroads, the court also 
sought to fashion uniform national standards 
that guarded investment capital against im-
pairment by inadequate compensation. Further, 
it became apparent that out-of-state investors 
had no meaningful opportunity to "resort to the 
polls" for protection, as suggested in Munn. Ju-
dicial redress was the only realistic remedy 
against unduly low rates. 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of 
Chicago, Milwaukee, however, was its far-reach-
ing impact on the constitutional protection of 
property rights generally. By mandating the ju-
dicial review of imposed rates, the Supreme 
Court implicitly recognized that protection of 
property went beyond title and possession. 
Ownership encompassed the right to use prop-
erty for economic value. This step markedly 
enlarged the range of property interests secured 
by the Constitution. 43 In addition the decision 
opened the door for the doctrine of economic 
due process. Once the Supreme Court accepted 
the notion that the due process clause mandated 
reasonableness in the context of rate controls, 
it was an easy step to apply this substantive 
restraint to economic regulations generally. 44 
Soon the court was assessing regulations against 
a reasonableness standard and striking down 
measures it deemed unduly restrictive of prop-
erty rights. 45 
The Chicago, Milwaukee ruling also had im-
plications for the reach of the takings clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. The court's expressed 
worry that rate regulations might deprive the 
railroad of its property without due process por-
tended extension of the takings clause to the 
states. In fact the dissenters had complained 
that the majority opinion proceeded on the as-
sumption that the Constitution prohibited the 
states from taking private property without 
compensation. The dissenting justices pointed 
out that "there is no such clause," and that the 
states could make their own regulations gov-
erning the payment of just compensation. 46 Yet 
the majority opinion's tendency to assimilate 
due process protection of property with depri-
vation of lawful usage foreshadowed a prompt 
judicial move to enlarge the guarantees avail-
able to property owners under the Fifth Amend-
ment. In Chicago, BurUngtan and Quincy Railroad 
Company v. Chicago (1897) the justices unan-
imously held that the just compensation re-
quirement constituted an essential element of 
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 47 Hence, the just compensation 
principle became in effect the first provision of 
the Bill of Rights to be applied against the states. 
The Chicago, Milwaukee ruling had a partic-
ular impact on the states of the Great Plains. 
Responding to farmer dissatisfaction with the 
management of railroads, lawmakers in the prai-
rie jurisdictions enacted a host of laws designed 
to restrict passenger and freight rates and the 
charges of grain elevators. Consequently, en-
larged judicial review of railroad charges would 
be felt keenly in the Great Plains. Indeed much 
of the rate litigation after 1890 originated from 
the prairie states. 48 
An unresolved question raised by Chicago, 
Milwaukee, of course, was how to distinguish a 
valid rate regulation from a confiscatory rate. 
The Supreme Court wrestled with this complex 
issue in a number of cases during the 1890s. 
Eventually, in Smyth v. Ames (1898), the court 
unanimously held that a utility was constitu-
tionally entitled to a "fair return" upon the "fair 
value" of its property.49 An attempt to protect 
regulated industries against confiscatory rates, 
the fair value rule proved difficult to administer. 
In the ensuing decades federal courts became 
heavily involved in supervising the rate-making 
process. 50 At the same time Congress enacted a 
series of statutes that imposed more stringent 
federal controls over railroad charges. 51 
CONCLUSION 
Chicago, Milwaukee was a landmark case in 
which the Supreme Court moved toward more 
vigorous protection of property rights. Histo-
rians, influenced by the Progressive school, have 
often criticized the decision for giving federal 
courts the power to review the substantive rea-
sonableness of state-imposed rates. Charles 
Fairman, for example, championed the Munn 
doctrine and Justice Bradley's dissenting opin-
ion in Chicago, Milwaukee. "Who can doubt," 
he asked, "that the Court would have done 
much better had it never quit the path Justice 
Bradley first pointed out?"52 
This analysis, however, is open to dispute. 
Farmers and shippers who called for railroad rate 
regulations often pursued an opportunistic course 
that benefite'd their economic interests. In a 
sense, then, the movement for railroad regu-
lation sought a redistribution of wealth from the 
carriers to consumers. State agencies frequently 
yielded to parochial pressures in setting rates, 
thereby threatening the long-term economic 
health of the railroads. Yet only by generating 
a profit could the railroads attract capital in-
vestment and continue to provide services. It 
followed that state rate regulations had a direct 
impact on national transportation policy. Her-
bert Hovenkamp has pointed out that "the po-
tential for abuse, particularly for free-riding by 
the states, was substantial, and federal control 
by either legislation or judicial intervention was 
clearly necessary. " The federal courts, he added, 
were "the only competent federal arm to control 
state ftee-riding and protect the integrity of the 
national railroad system. "53 
Although criticized for granting the federal 
courts authority to review the substance of rates, 
the justices of the Supreme Court followed sound 
instincts. Judicial review placed some restraint 
on the marked tendency of legislators and reg-
ulators to set railroad rates at unrealistically low 
levels, often at the behest of special interest 
groups. Despite the rule of Smyth v. Ames, gov-
ernmental regulation of railroad charges steadily 
increased in the early decades of the twentieth 
century. Indeed several scholars have identified 
heavy-handed rate regulation and cumbersome 
rate-setting procedures as major factors in the 
decline of America's railroads. 54 Arguably the 
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court should have reviewed rates more aggres-
sively to protect the security of capital invest-
ment and thus encourage maintenance of an 
adequate rail service. 
Last Chicago, Milwaukee has demonstrated 
impressive staying power. Following the con-
stitutional revolution of 1937 the Supreme Court 
abandoned economic due process, retreated from 
meaningful review of rate fixing, and relegated 
property rights to a secondary position. 55 But 
the Supreme Court has never overruled Chi-
cago, Milwaukee and continues to require judi-
cial review of administrative decisions touching 
on constitutional rights. Recently the Supreme 
Court has even shown renewed interest in con-
stitutional restraints on utility rate making. In 
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch (1989) ChiefJus-
tice William Rehnquist, speaking for the court, 
reiterated the long-standing rule: "The guiding 
principle has been that the Constitution pro-
tects utilities from being limited to a charge for 
their property serving the public which is so 
'unjust' as to be confiscatory. "56 Rehnquist 
stressed that a rate must afford adequate com-
pensation. Thus after one hundred years Chicago, 
Milwaukee continues to influence constitutional 
law and provide at least symbolic protection to 
property rights. 
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